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I. INTRODUCTION 
While the Supreme Court’s recent opinion in Federal Trade 
Commission v. Actavis, Inc.1 resolved the circuit split regarding 
reverse payment settlements,2 the full scope of its decision is yet to 
be seen. The Court declined to hold that reverse payments were 
presumptively unlawful or that they were immune from antitrust 
attack. Rather, the Court held that a rule-of-reason approach 
should apply when evaluating the antitrust implications of a reverse 
payment settlement. The Court left it to lower courts to “jump in 
the briar patch”3 and structure the rule-of-reason antitrust 
litigation. Yet, the Actavis decision, statements by the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC), and some subsequent rulings provide insight 
into what may constitute an acceptable reverse payment settlement 
 
 1.  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013). 
 2.  Id. at 2227. These settlements have been referred to by a variety of 
names. While some may find this term misleading or pejorative, the Court chose 
to use this term to describe a specific type of settlement and I will do the same for 
consistency. 
 3.  See In re AndroGel Antitrust Litig. (No. II), No. 1:09-MD-2084, 2013 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 174273, at *10 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 23, 2013) (“As much as I would love 
some guidance from the Eleventh Circuit on how in the heck a trial judge (and a 
jury) is supposed to apply the Actavis decision to an actual case, I doubt that the 
Eleventh Circuit is going to jump into that briar patch until it has to.”).  
2
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agreement. Lower courts will have to decide some seminal 
questions in light of the decision: 
(1) What is a “reverse payment”? Can it include nonmonetary 
compensation? 
(2) What makes a payment “large”? 
(3) If the first-filed Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) 
applicant gave up its statutorily granted 180-day market 
exclusivity, does that impact the analysis? 
(4) When is a reverse payment justified? 
(5) Should courts apply the rule-of-reason analysis to all patent 
settlements or only after it has determined that there was a 
reverse payment? 
The Actavis decision does not directly answer these questions. 
However, a detailed review of the facts of Actavis, the decision itself, 
statements by the FTC regarding its view of reverse payment 
agreements, and some subsequent rulings provide insight into how 
these questions may be answered and what may constitute an 
acceptable reverse payment settlement agreement. 
II. WHAT ARE REVERSE PAYMENT SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS? 
The Court characterized a “reverse payment” settlement 
agreement as a settlement that “requires the patentee to pay the 
alleged infringer, rather than the other way around.”4 The Court 
described these settlements as typically taking the form of 
Company A suing Company B for patent infringement. Company A 
and Company B settle under terms that require (1) the claimed 
infringer, Company B, to stay off the market until the patent’s term 
expires, and (2) the patentee, Company A, paying Company B. The 
Court noted that 
[a]pparently most if not all reverse payment settlement 
agreements arise in the context of pharmaceutical drug 
regulation, and specifically in the context of suits brought 
under statutory provisions allowing a generic drug 
manufacturer (seeking speedy marketing approval) to 
challenge the validity of a patent owned by an already 
approved brand name drug owner.5 
 
 4.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2227. 
 5.  Id. at 2227. In his dissent, Chief Justice Roberts disagrees with this 
assertion. He points out that a patentee may pay an alleged infringer to drop 
counterclaims of invalidity. Id. at 2245 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
3
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In its brief, Respondent Solvay posited as to why this might be 
the case. According to Solvay, these settlements have “a different 
appearance” due to the Hatch-Waxman statutory framework.6 This 
framework typically provides for patent litigation before any 
allegedly infringing product enters the market and before any 
monetary damages can accrue. The FTC views reverse payments as 
subverting the balance of competing policies struck by this 
framework.7 According to the FTC, the framework reflects “a 
balance of benefits for generic manufacturers and protections from 
competition for brand-name manufacturers.” Reverse payments 
upset this balance by giving the brand name manufacturer the 
added opportunity to “purchase still more protections by sharing 
monopoly profits.”8 
A. The Basic Framework of Hatch-Waxman Litigation 
Under the framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act, patent 
litigation is typically required. A drug manufacturer seeking to 
market a new prescription drug must submit a New Drug 
Application with the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).9 
According to the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of 
America, on average, an innovator pharmaceutical company invests 
more than one billion dollars for each FDA-approved medicine.10 
To protect these investments, brand name manufacturers seek 
patent protection. Once the FDA has approved the brand name 
drug for marketing, a manufacturer of a generic drug can enter the 
market by filing an ANDA.11 An ANDA requires that the generic 
manufacturer specify that its product will have the same active 
ingredient and is biologically equivalent to the approved brand 
name drug.12 This allows the generic manufacturer to avoid the 
“‘costly and time-consuming’ studies needed to obtain approval” 
 
 6.  Brief for Respondent Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. at 18, Actavis, 133 S. 
Ct. 2223 (No. 12-416), 2012 WL 5507198. 
 7.  Brief for the Petitioner at 16–17, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (No. 12-416), 
2013 WL 267027. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012).  
 10.  Brief for Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America 
(PhRMA) as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 6, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 
(No. 12-416), 2013 WL 769196. 
 11.  See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2). 
 12.  Id. § 355(j)(2)(A). 
4
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for the brand name drug.13 As such, the average generic drug costs 
only about one-third as much as the average brand name drug.14 
Yet, the consumers cannot enjoy these cost savings immediately. 
The timing of an ANDA’s approval depends on the patent 
covering the brand name drug, since the FDA cannot authorize a 
generic drug that would infringe a patent.15 To facilitate approval, 
the Hatch-Waxman framework directs brand name manufacturers 
to list the patents covering the drug in the Approved Drug Products 
with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations (commonly referred to as 
the “Orange Book”).16 In turn, the generic manufacturer, when 
filing its ANDA, must provide assurances that its proposed product 
will not infringe any patent. This can take the form of certifying 
that the relevant patents have expired, requesting approval to 
market once the patents still in force expire, or by certifying that 
any listed relevant patent “is invalid or will not be infringed by the 
manufacture, use or sale” of the proposed drug (typically called a 
“paragraph IV” certification).17 The filing of a paragraph IV 
certification is a technical act of infringement and often provokes 
the litigation.18 If the patentee brings suit within forty-five days of 
the paragraph IV certification, the FDA must withhold approval of 
the ANDA until a court resolves the issues of patent validity and 
infringement, or thirty months have expired.19 The framework also 
provides an incentive to the first ANDA filer by granting the first 
filer 180 days of exclusivity.20 During this period of exclusivity, no 
other generic can compete with the brand name drug. As stated by 
the Supreme Court, the “vast majority of potential profits for a 
generic manufacturing materialize during this 180-day exclusivity 
period.”21 
This structure is not conducive to “typical settlements.” In a 
“typical” patent case, the monetary value of potential damage from 
 
 13.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228 (citing Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic Inc., 
496 U.S. 661, 676 (1990)). 
 14.  Brief for Generic Pharmaceutical Association as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 8–9, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 769341. 
 15.  Caraco Pharm., Inc. v. Novo Nordisk, 132 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (2012). 
 16.  Id.; see also 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). 
 17.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(IV). 
 18.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2228.  
 19.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). 
 20.  Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). 
 21.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 
Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 7, at 6). 
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the infringement helps guide the form of the settlement. The 
accused infringer can evaluate the risk by calculating the amount of 
money that a jury will award. This is tied to the amount of 
sales/profit made from the alleged infringing product. The 
patentee can evaluate its risk by looking at the historical impact the 
alleged infringing product had on its product. The patentee can, at 
least in some respects, make an educated assessment of the value of 
the risk of trial. These risk/reward calculations are more 
speculative in the Hatch-Waxman context. The generic manu-
facturer’s calculus is based upon the likelihood that it will succeed 
in litigation, the timing of the result, and the forecasted profits for 
the potential drug. The brand name manufacturer’s calculus is 
based upon the likelihood of success at litigation, the timing of the 
result, and the forecasted impact of the generic on the market. 
Because of the automatic stay of FDA approval, the timing of 
the result is of great importance. Unlike a typical patentee that 
wants to reach the result as soon as possible to realize its monetary 
loss, or at a minimum prevent the alleged infringer from taking 
some of its future profits, the brand name manufacturer is 
incentivized to keep the litigation going. The brand name 
manufacturer does not face any threat of competition until the 
FDA approves the generic drug. The FDA will not approve the drug 
without a court order or until the thirty-month stay has expired. 
Thus, the brand name manufacturer has no incentive to accept 
payment from the generic manufacturer. The brand name 
manufacturer is not currently suffering a monetary loss and does 
not need to “stop the bleeding.” Without a competitor in the 
marketplace, there is generally no incentive for the brand name 
manufacturer to accept any payment from the generic 
manufacturer that is not close to the amount of profits it will 
receive during the term of the patent. Unlike the typical alleged 
infringer who is accruing profits during the litigation, the generic 
manufacturer has no product during the litigation. The generic 
manufacturer seeks quick resolution so it can enter the 
marketplace. Thus, the generic manufacturer has no incentive to 
pay the brand name manufacturer anything more than future 
litigation costs to enter the market. These incentives create 
settlements with a “different appearance.” Settlements generally do 
6
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not take the form of the alleged infringer paying the patentee to 
drop its claim and end the litigation.22 
B. The Federal Trade Commission’s View of Reverse Payment Settlements 
and Its Future Goals 
Under the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003, the FTC and the Department of Justice 
are charged with reviewing patent litigation settlements between 
the brand name manufacturer and the generic manufacturer.23 
Each year, the FTC reports the number of settlements it deems 
potentially anticompetitive. For fiscal year 2012 (October 1, 2011–
September 30, 2012) the FTC reviewed 140 patent settlements and 
deemed forty settlements as potentially involving “pay-for-delay”24 
payments.25 The FTC designated them as potentially involving pay-
for-delay “because they contain both compensation to the generic 
manufacturer and a restriction on the generic manufacturer’s 
ability to market its product.”26 Of these forty settlements, nineteen 
contained what the FTC classified as compensation in “the form of 
a brand manufacturer’s promise not to make an authorized generic 
(‘AG’) in competition with the generic manufacturer’s product for 
some period of time (a ‘no-AG agreement’).”27 Of the remaining 
140 settlements, the FTC deemed eighty-one as “restrict[ing] the 
generic manufacturer’s ability to market its product, but 
contain[ing] no explicit compensation,” and nineteen as having no 
restrictions on generic entry.28 According to the FTC, there were a 
record number of settlements containing potential pay-for-delay 
 
 22.  The preceding considerations are based on the author’s experience. 
 23.  See Actavis Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2242 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). For an 
explanation of the Act’s filing requirements, see the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, §§ 1111–1118, 
117 Stat. 2066, 2461–64. 
 24.  The FTC’s definition of “pay-for-delay” appears on its face to be broader 
than the Court’s definition of reverse payments. The details in each of these 
settlement agreements are not publicly available.  
 25.  BUREAU OF COMPETITION, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND 
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites 
/default/files/documents/reports/agreements-filed-federal-trade-commission 
-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement-and/130117mmareport.pdf. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  Id. 
7
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agreements in fiscal year 2012.29 As shown in the table below, the 
FTC has increasingly classified settlements as pay-for-delay. 
 
Fiscal Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Final Settlements 14 11 28 33 66 68 113 156 140 
Potential 
Pay-for-Delay 




0 2 9 11 13 15 26 18 23 
Figure 1: Settlements Classified as Pay-for-Delay
30 
Yet, as pointed out by Respondents Par/Paddock in their 
joint response brief, and as shown below, percentage of final 
settlements that are classified as pay-for-delay agreements is 
generally declining.31 
Figure 2: Percentage of Final Settlements FTC Classified as Pay-for-Delay
32 
 
 29.  Id. at 2. 
 30.  See Id. 
 31.  The rise in “potential pay-for-delay” agreements in FY 2012 appears to 
reflect an increase in settlement agreements in which the brand manufacturer 
agreed not to market an “authorized generic.” 
 32.  Chart created by author based on data in Brief for Respondents 
Par/Paddock at 21–22, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) 
(No. 12-416), 2013 WL 682804. 
8
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The FTC believes that the Actavis decision puts it in a much 
stronger position.33 The FTC has stated its commitment to take the 
following actions in light of the decision:34 
 pursue pay-for-delay matters currently in litigation and 
seek appropriate relief for consumers; 
 monitor private litigations alleging pay-for-delay 
agreements and leverage Commission experience and 
expertise by filing amicus briefs where appropriate; 
 investigate pending pay-for-delay matters; 
 examine new settlements that companies file with the 
Commission pursuant to the Medicare Modernization 
Act of 2003 (“MMA”) and investigate those that raise 
anticompetitive concerns; and 
 issue regular reports on pharmaceutical settlements 
filed with the Commission pursuant to the MMA.35 
The FTC has also committed to re-examine previously filed 
settlements in light of the Actavis decision.36 The FTC intends to 
use all of the tools at its disposal, “including prospective restrictions 
to prevent future violations, rescinding the illegal agreement, and 
taking other actions to help expedite generic entry,”37 such as 
seeking determination that a first filer has forfeited its 180-day 
exclusivity.38 
III. LESSONS LEARNED FROM ACTAVIS 
While the Supreme Court left it for lower courts to structure 
the rule-of-reason for this kind of antitrust litigation, the Court’s 
opinion provides some insight into how lower courts should view a 
 
 33.  Pay-for-Delay Deals: Limiting Competition and Costing Consumers: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition Policy & Consumer Rights of the S. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 2 (2013) [hereinafter Pay-for-Delay Hearing] (statement 
of Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, Federal Trade Commission). 
 34.  Id. at 10. The FTC has also committed to pursue its two pending pay-for-
delay litigations: Actavis and Federal Trade Commission v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 08-cv-
2141 (E.D. Pa. filed Feb. 13, 2008). 
 35.  Pay-for-Delay Hearing, supra note 33, at 3 (footnote omitted). 
 36.  Id. at 12. 
 37.  Id. at 3.  
 38.  Id. at 3 n.11 (“[A] generic company automatically forfeits its entitlement 
to the 180-day exclusivity period that is otherwise available to first filing generics if 
it is found to have violated the antitrust laws or the Federal Trade Commission 
Act. Amended 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(V) (2003).”). 
9
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reverse payment. To gain a full understanding of the Court’s 
opinion it is important to view the case against the backdrop of the 
facts. 
A. Synopsis of the Facts of the Actavis Decision 
Solvay received FDA approval for the brand name 
pharmaceutical drug AndroGel in 2000.39 In January 2003, Solvay 
obtained the relevant patent and listed it in the Orange Book.40 
Later that year, in May 2003, Actavis, Inc. (previously known as 
Watson Pharmaceuticals) filed its ANDA seeking to make a generic 
version of AndroGel. Actavis was the first filer, and by statute, was 
eligible for the 180 days of market exclusivity once it launched its 
generic version.41 Shortly thereafter, Paddock filed an ANDA for its 
own product.42 Both Actavis and Paddock certified under 
paragraph IV that the proposed products did not infringe the 
patent and/or that the patent was invalid.43 Par did not file its own 
ANDA. Rather, it joined Paddock’s ANDA and agreed to share in 
the patent litigation costs as well as share in any profits Paddock 
might receive from selling its generic product.44 In August 2003, 
Solvay sued Actavis and Paddock separately.45 From late 2003 to late 
2005, the cases progressed with discovery, the parties filed claim 
construction briefs, and Actavis and Par/Paddock filed motions for 
nondispositive partial summary judgment.46 In January 2006, the 
thirty-month stay expired and Actavis received final FDA approval.47 
At this point, Actavis could have launched “at risk” (i.e. Actavis 
could have launched its generic drug despite the pending 
litigation).48 Had it launched, Actavis would have been liable for 
significant damages if it had lost the pending litigation.49 
 
 39.  Fed. Trade. Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013). 
 40.  See id.; Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc. at 5–6, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 2223 
(No. 12-416), 2013 WL 662705 (discussing the process by which Unimed and 
Besins’s NDA was approved and listed in the Orange Book and Solvay’s later 
acquisition of Unimed). 
 41.  Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc., supra note 40, at 6. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc., supra note 40, at 6. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Id. 
10
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In September 2006, the parties settled both litigations.50 The 
district court had not issued a decision on claim construction or on 
the pending partial summary judgment motions.51 The settlement 
agreements dismissed the pending cases. The agreements granted 
patent licenses to Actavis and Par/Paddock. The patent licenses 
allowed Actavis and Par/Paddock to launch their respective generic 
drugs starting in August 2015. This was five years before the patent 
was set to expire. As part of the settlement, Actavis relinquished its 
claim to the 180-day market exclusivity.52 
The parties also agreed to compensation for other services. 
Solvay agreed to pay Actavis, over nine years, an estimated $19–30 
million annually for Actavis to promote AndroGel to urologists.53 
Solvay agreed to pay Paddock $12 million to provide backup 
manufacturing capacity for AndroGel from 2006 until 2012. Finally, 
Solvay agreed to pay Par $10 million annually for Par to have its 
sales force promote AndroGel to primary care physicians.54 Solvay’s 
payments represented less than ten percent of AndroGel 
revenues.55 For example, in 2007, AndroGel had sales of more than 
$400 million.56 
B. A Detailed Review of the Supreme Court’s Five Sets of Considerations 
to Bring a Claim. 
Faced with these facts, the Supreme Court concluded that “the 
FTC should have been given the opportunity to prove its antitrust 
claim.”57 The Court based its conclusion on the following five sets 
of considerations: 
(1) The restraint has the “potential for genuine adverse effects on 
competition.”58 
(2) The anticompetitive consequences of the reverse payment “will 
at least sometimes prove unjustified.”59 
 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 7. 
 52.  Id. at 8. 
 53.  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229 (2013). 
 54.  Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc., supra note 40, at 8; Brief for the 
Petitioner, supra note 21, at 11–12. 
 55.  Brief for Respondent Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc. at 6, Actavis, 133 S. 
Ct. 2223 (No. 12-416) 2013 WL 648743. 
 56.  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 21, at 11–12. 
 57.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2234. 
 58.  Id. 
11
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(3) “Where a reverse payment threatens to work unjustified . . . 
harm, the patentee likely possesses the power to bring that 
harm.”60 
(4) The antitrust action is feasible and it is normally not necessary 
to litigate the patent’s validity.61 
(5) “The fact that a large, unjustified reverse payment risks 
antitrust liability does not prevent [potential settlement of the 
patent claims].”62 
Reviewing each of these considerations, and, in turn, 
considering the facts of Actavis, it appears that almost any payment 
from the brand name manufacturer to the generic manufacturer 
can serve as a basis for an antitrust action. 
1. Potential Genuine Adverse Effect on Competition 
Based on the Court’s opinion, a payment from the brand 
name manufacturer to the generic manufacturer, regardless of the 
parties’ stated purpose for the payment, is sufficient to meet this 
first consideration. In the Court’s view, “[t]he payment in effect 
amounts to a purchase by the patentee of the exclusive right to sell 
its product, a right it already claims but would lose if the patent 
litigation were to continue and the patent were held invalid or not 
infringed by the generic product.”63 The fact that Solvay, Actavis, 
and Par/Paddock classified the payments as part of a separate 
business deal did not factor into the Court’s opinion. Rather, 
presumably because this was a motion to dismiss, the Court viewed 
the settlement on terms set by the FTC—a payment in return for 
staying out of the market and keeping prices at patentee-set levels.64 
The Court conceded that settlements, like the one at issue, which 
permit the generic manufacturer to enter the market prior to the 
patent expiring, would bring about competition that benefits the 
consumer.65 But the Court did not view the early entry as enough to 
overcome the adverse effect of the payment. Rather, the Court 
stated that the payment may “provide strong evidence that the 
 
 59.  Id. at 2235–36. 
 60.  Id. at 2236. 
 61.  See id. 
 62.  Id. at 2237. 
 63.  Id. at 2234. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
12
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patentee seeks to induce the generic challenger to abandon its 
claim with a share of its monopoly profits that would otherwise be 
lost in the competitive market.”66 
In addition, the Court did not take into account that the 
settlement at issue allowed the second filer, Par/Paddock, early 
market entry. Actavis gave up its 180-day exclusivity,67 so Par, 
Paddock, and Actavis would all enter the market on the same day. 
Arguably, consumers received a large benefit by Actavis giving up 
its right as competition would increase. According to the FTC, the 
price typically drops twenty percent when a first generic enters the 
market and up to eighty-five percent when there are multiple 
generics in the marketplace.68 While, as the Court recognized, the 
180-day market exclusivity granted to the first filer provided a 
valuable right which “can be worth several hundred million 
dollars,” the Court focused its analysis on the payment itself.69 The 
Court noted that according to scholars, “where only one party owns 
a patent, it is virtually unheard of outside of pharmaceuticals for 
that party to pay the accused infringer to settle the lawsuit.”70 
The Court was not persuaded that the Hatch-Waxman Act’s 
unique regulatory framework required a different result.71 The 
Court viewed the Hatch-Waxman Act’s grant of 180-day market 
exclusivity as a barrier to competition.72 According to the Court, 
subsequent ANDA filers would be deterred from bringing suit once 
the first filer settles.73 Because of the 180-day exclusivity, a litigation 
victory by a subsequent ANDA filer will free not only that ANDA 
filer, but all other potential competitors. Thus, according to the 
Court, the potential reward to the subsequent challenger is 
significantly less than the patentee’s payment to the first filer.74 In 
addition, the subsequent ANDA filer, after learning that the first 
filer has settled, if sued, will have to wait roughly thirty months 
before receiving FDA approval.75 Because of these features, the 
Court concluded that a reverse payment settlement with the first 
 
 66.  Id. at 2235. 
 67.  Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc., supra note 40, at 8.  
 68.  Pay-for-Delay Hearing, supra note 33, at 6.  
 69.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235. 
 70.  Id. 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Id. (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2012)). 
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filer “removes from consideration the most motivated challenger, 
and the one closest to introducing competition.”76 Thus, from the 
Court’s perspective, the payment from the patentee to the alleged 
infringer, alone, is enough to meet the consideration that there is 
potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.77 
2. Was the Payment “Justified” 
The Court also determined that anticompetitive consequences 
from reverse payments will sometimes be unjustified. The Court 
noted that there may be legitimate justifications for payment.78 But 
the time to raise justifications is at the antitrust proceedings.79 
The Court did provide some insight into potential 
justifications. First, the reverse payment may be no more than a 
rough approximation of the litigation expenses saved through 
settlement.80 However, this amount may not be enough to 
incentivize the parties to settle. The typical cost of Hatch-Waxman 
litigation is approximately $6 million through trial.81 Of this 
$6 million, it costs approximately $3.25 million to reach the end of 
discovery.82 For example, in Actavis, the parties had completed 
discovery.83 Based on the typical litigation costs, a rough 
approximation of the litigation expenses saved through settlement 
would be $2.75 million in total. In contrast, Actavis settled for an 
estimate of $20–30 million per year, Paddock settled for $2 million 
per year, and Par settled for $10 million per year.84 Based on these 
numbers, it is questionable whether litigation expenses saved 
through settlement alone provides enough incentive to settle 
Hatch-Waxman litigation. 
The Court also noted that payment from the brand name 
manufacturer to the generic manufacturer may represent 
 
 76.  Id. (citing C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent 
Settlement as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1586 (2006)). 
 77.  See id. at 2235. 
 78.  Id. at 2236. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  See AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC 
SURVEY 37 (2013) (referring to more than $25 million at risk). 
 82.  See id. 
 83.  See Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc., supra note 40, at 8.  
 84.  See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229; Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc., supra 
note 40, at 8; Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 21, at 11–12.  
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compensation for other services, such as distributing the brand 
name drug or developing a market for the drug.85 In Actavis, the 
settlement stated that the payments were for other services.86 
Actavis was paid to promote the brand name drug to urologists, 
Paddock was paid to provide backup manufacturing capacity for 
the brand name drug, and Par was paid to have its sales team 
promote the brand name drug to primary care physicians.87 Yet, at 
this stage of the proceedings, these factors did not sway the Court. 
Rather, the Court left this issue for the antitrust proceedings.88 
The Court did not limit the justification to these examples. 
The Court clearly stated that “[t]here may be other justifications” 
that would not raise the concern that the patentee was using its 
monopoly profits to avoid the risk of losing the litigation.89 
3. The Patentee’s Ability to Bring About the Anticompetitive Harm 
The Court determined that the size of the reverse payment is 
indicative of market power and thus the patentee’s power to bring 
the harm into practice.90 The Court did not provide any analysis as 
to whether the size of Solvay’s payments were “large sums” in the 
context of the case and thus indicative of its power. Rather, relying 
on studies referred to by the FTC in its briefing, the Court stated 
that “reverse payment agreements are associated with the presence 
of higher-than-competitive profits—a strong indication of market 
power.”91 
The strength of Solvay’s patent also did not factor into this 
consideration. While the Court stated that “[a]n important patent 
itself helps to ensure such power,” the Court did not analyze the 
strengths and weaknesses of Solvay’s patent.92 It appears that, in the 
context of Hatch-Waxman settlements, a payment from patentee to 
the alleged infringer was sufficient to meet this consideration. The 
logical conclusion is that the “importance” of the patent, and thus, 
patentee’s market power, is dictated by the patentee listing the 
patent in the Orange Book as covering the brand name drug. 
 
 85.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
 86.  Id. at 2229. 
 87.  See Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc., supra note 40, at 6–7. 
 88.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238. 
 89.  Id. at 2236. 
 90.  Id.  
 91.  Id. 
 92.  See id. 
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4. The Size of the Unexplained Payment Is a Workable Surrogate for 
Litigating the Patent Issues and Makes the Antitrust Litigation 
Feasible. 
It is the Court’s view that it is not necessary to litigate the 
patent to answer the antitrust questions arising from a reverse 
payment.93 Rather, the Court relies on the size and justification of 
the payment. According to the Court “[a]n unexplained large 
reverse payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee has 
serious doubts about the patent’s survival.”94 The Eleventh Circuit 
disagreed with this assessment. In its opinion, “[w]hen hundreds of 
millions of dollars of lost profits are at stake, ‘even a patentee 
confident in the validity of its patent might pay a potential infringer 
a substantial sum in settlement.’”95 Thus, the payment size was 
reflective of the “reality of patent litigation and the risks it presents 
to the patent holder.”96 While the Court recognized that a patentee 
may be willing to make a large payment to avoid the risk of 
invalidity, that justification alone is insufficient to avoid antitrust 
liability.97 The payment, without any additional explanation, “likely 
seeks to prevent the risk of competition.”98 Simply put, in the 
Court’s view, the size of an unexplained payment could be used as 
a “workable surrogate” instead of litigating the patent issues. 99 
5. Antitrust Liability for Large Unjustified Reverse Payments Does 
Not Prevent Parties from Settling 
The final consideration in the Court’s analysis is the parties’ 
ability to settle. According to the Court, parties are still able to 
settle patent claims.100 The primary example the Court provides is a 
settlement which allows the generic manufacturer to enter the 
market prior to expiration and without payment from the brand 
name drug.101 Yet, this is only an example. The Court refused to 
 
 93.  See id. at 2237. 
 94.  Id. 
 95.  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharm. Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1313 (11th 
Cir. 2012) (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1310 
(11th Cir. 2003)).  
 96.  Id.  
 97.  See Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  See id. at 2236–37. 
 100.  Id. at 2237. 
 101.  Id. 
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hold that all reverse payment settlements are presumptively 
unlawful. Rather, the question is simply what the reasons for the 
reverse payment are. As the Court notes, “[i]f the basic reason is a 
desire to maintain and to share patent-generated monopoly profits, 
then, in the absence of some other justification, the antitrust laws 
are likely to forbid the arrangement.”102 
C. What Is Left Unanswered by Actavis 
Dismissing antitrust claims based on reverse payment 
settlements has become more challenging given the Court’s 
analysis and its decision to allow the FTC the opportunity to prove 
its case. A broad reading of the opinion would lead to the 
conclusion that to survive a motion to dismiss, the FTC must plead 
that there was a large payment from the innovator company to the 
generic filer. While throughout its analysis the Court classified the 
payment as unexplained or unjustified, it explicitly stated that an 
antitrust defendant may have legitimate justifications for the 
payment.103 If this is the case, the Court leaves open three seminal 
questions: (1) what constitutes a payment?; (2) what makes a 
payment “large”?; and (3) what impact, if any, does giving up 180-
day exclusivity have in the analysis? 
1. What Is “Payment”? 
In Actavis, the payment was clear. Payment was in the form of 
money from Solvay to the generic challengers. The question 
remains whether nonmonetary benefits should also be viewed as a 
payment. Many settlements include terms that provide non-
monetary benefits to the generic manufacturer. For example, 
brand name manufacturers enter into no-authorized-generic (AG) 
agreements with generic manufacturers. These no-AG agreements, 
according to the FTC, typically take the “form of a brand 
manufacturer’s promise not to market an [AG] in competition with 
the generic manufacturer’s product for some period of time.”104 
 
 102.  Id.  
 103.  Id. at 2236. 
 104.  FED. TRADE COMM’N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND 
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2012, at 1 
(2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports 
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The FTC classifies these types of agreements as pay-for-delay, but 
district courts have reached various conclusions. 
a. District Court Construes Reverse Payment Settlements as 
Requiring a Monetary Payment 
For example, in In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust 
Litigation, Judge Walls found that a no-AG agreement was not 
payment.105 In that case, GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) sold Lamictal 
Tablets and Lamictal Chewables to treat epilepsy and bipolar 
disorder.106 The drug was profitable; for example, domestic sales of 
Lamictal Tablets from March 2007 to March 2008 exceeded $2 
billion.107 Teva filed two ANDAs, which contained paragraph IV 
certifications, with the FDA in 2002.108 GSK brought suit.109 The case 
went to trial and the judge ruled from the bench that one claim of 
the asserted patent was invalid.110 The judge was still deliberating 
the validity of the remaining claims when the parties reached a 
settlement.111 The settlement did not include a monetary payment. 
The key settlement terms were: (1) Teva was permitted to sell 
generic chewables by June 1, 2005, supplied by GSK, approximately 
thirty-seven months before the expiration of the patent, and before 
FDA approval of Teva’s tablet ANDA; (2) Teva was permitted to sell 
generic tablets on the expiration date of the patent on July 21, 2008 
and, if GSK did not receive pediatric exclusivity, Teva could enter 
the market approximately six months earlier; (3) GSK granted Teva 
a waiver of any pediatric exclusivity GSK was granted; and (4) GSK 




 105.  In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-995, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 9257 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014). In light of the Actavis decision, Judge 
Walls reconsidered his previous finding that a settlement including a non-AG 
agreement was not a sufficient basis for an antitrust claim. The earlier opinion can 
be found at In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-995, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 183627 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2012) (unpublished). 
 106.  In re Lamictal, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9257, at *2. 
 107.  Id. at *2. 
 108.  Id. at *3. 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id. at *3–4. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at *4–6. 
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Direct purchasers brought suit alleging that the settlement 
violated antitrust law.113 Defendants GSK and Teva moved to dismiss 
for failing to allege a cause of action on the grounds that the 
settlement did not involve a cash-only reverse payment.114 
The court, in an unpublished decision, initially granted the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss.115 In its earlier decision, the court 
found that “the term ‘reverse payment’ was not sufficiently broad to 
encompass any benefit that may fall to Teva in a negotiated 
settlement.”116 Moreover, the court recognized that Teva received 
consideration in the settlement and “consideration is an essential 
element of any enforceable contract.”117 The court also noted that 
“there is ‘payment’ in every settlement” and classified this 
settlement as based on negotiated entry dates.118 Accordingly, the 
court found that the settlements met a strong policy objective by 
introducing “generic products onto the market sooner than what 
would have occurred had GSK’s patent not been challenged.”119 
The court also considered the real-world impact of settlement. 
When monetary payments are not part of the settlement equation, 
“companies with abundant cash have less leverage to delay entry of 
generic drugs.”120 GSK needed to find a different bargaining chip 
and “GSK’s promise not to enter the market with its own generic 
products is such an example.”121 
The Actavis decision did not alter the court’s view of the 
settlement. According to the court, Actavis only applies to monetary 
reverse payments.122 The court was unwilling to extend the Actavis 
holding beyond its facts.123 The court found that “nothing in Actavis 
says that a settlement contains a reverse payment when it confers 
substantial financial benefits or that a [no-AG] agreement is a 
 
 113.  Id. at *6. 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-995, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 183627, at *15 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2012). 
 117.  Id. at *16. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at *19. 
 120.  Id. at *20. 
 121.  Id.  
 122.  In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-995, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 9257, at *18–26 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014). 
 123.  Id. at *25–26. 
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‘payment.’”124 The court read the majority and dissenting opinions 
as “reek[ing] with discussion of payment of money.”125 While the 
court recognized that Black’s Law Dictionary defined “payment” as 
“[p]erformance of an obligation by the delivery of money or some 
other valuable thing accepted in partial or full discharge of an 
obligation,” the court did not find that Actavis supported such a 
broad reading.126 
b. District Courts Construe Reverse Payments As Including 
Nonmonetary Payments 
While Judge Walls found that the term “reverse payments” and 
the decision in Actavis constituted only cash payments, two courts 
have recently reached a different conclusion.127 Judge Sheridan 
viewed the term differently in In re Lipitor Antitrust Litigation.128 
Pending before the court was the direct purchaser class plaintiffs’ 
motion for leave to amend the consolidated complaint and the 
defendants’129 motion to dismiss various complaints on multiple 
grounds.130 The motions were originally briefed before the Actavis 
decision. The court requested supplemental briefing in light of the 
decision.131 The case involves Pfizer’s drug Lipitor.132 Pfizer 
obtained seven patents covering different aspects of the Lipitor 
product.133 “Ranbaxy filed the first . . . ANDA to market generic 
Lipitor.”134 Ranbaxy certified, under paragraph IV, that the selling 
of its product would not infringe any valid claim.135 Pfizer brought 
suit. “From 2003 to 2006, the patent litigation progressed through 
discovery, trial,” a district court decision, and a federal circuit 
decision.136 In late 2006, the district court enjoined the FDA from 
 
 124.  Id. at *21. 
 125.  Id. 
 126.  Id. at *22 (alteration in original).  
 127.  Judge Walls found these decisions’ interpretation of Actavis as 
“unsupported by the words of Actavis or are inapposite.” Id. at *27.  
 128.  No. 3:12-cv-2389, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126468 (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 2013). 
 129.  Defendants include Pfizer, Inc., Pfizer Ireland Pharmaceuticals, Warner-
Lambert Co., and Warner-Lambert Co., LLC. Id. at *15. 
 130.  Id. at *14–15, *54–85. 
 131.  Id. at *92–93. 
 132.  Id. at *18. 
 133.  Id. at *19. 
 134.  Id. at *32. 
 135.  Id. at *32–33. 
 136.  Id. at *33. 
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approving Ranbaxy’s ANDA until March 2010.137 While the U.S. 
litigation was pending, Pfizer filed numerous international lawsuits 
against generic manufacturers.138 In 2007, Pfizer also initiated 
re-issue proceedings for one of the patents.139 Ranbaxy filed 
numerous protests during the re-issue proceedings.140 In addition, 
on March 24, 2008, Pfizer sued Ranbaxy alleging infringement of 
two non-Orange Book process patents, even though Ranbaxy was 
enjoined from selling its generic Lipitor.141 
In April 2008, Pfizer and Ranbaxy settled the reissue 
proceedings,142 and in June 2008, the parties entered into an 
agreement that “settled global patent proceedings regarding 
Lipitor including the U.S. patent litigations.”143 Ranbaxy agreed not 
to enter the market until November 30, 2011. Ranbaxy did not 
waive its 180-day exclusivity but dropped any challenges to the 
reissued patent.144 Pfizer also agreed to forgive the outstanding 
money judgments against Ranbaxy that were unrelated to Lipitor 
and settled Pfizer’s suit against Ranbaxy regarding a generic 
version of Caduet. 145 Pfizer also agreed to dismiss an action against 
Ranbaxy regarding Ranbaxy’s “at risk” launch of a generic version 
of Accupril.146 
The court dismissed most of the antitrust claims. However, the 
plaintiffs sought to amend their complaint to clarify and augment 
their reverse payment allegations.147 The plaintiffs argued that the 
Pfizer/Ranbaxy settlement of the Accupril litigation was a payment 
by Pfizer to Ranbaxy to delay the launch of generic Lipitor, despite 
the fact that Ranbaxy made a $1 million payment to Pfizer.148 The 
defendants argued that the proposed amendments were futile since 
Actavis applies only to settlements involving large monetary 
payments. Judge Sheridan disagreed. While declining to decide 
 
 137.  Id. at *36. 
 138.  Id. at *37–40. 
 139.  Id. at *40.  
 140.  Id. at *40–41. 
 141.  See id. at *45–47. 
 142.  Id. at *42. 
 143.  Id. at *47–48. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Caduet is a combination drug which contains the active ingredient in 
Lipitor. See id. at *48. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. at *94. 
 148.  Id. 
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whether the amendments would survive a motion to dismiss, the 
court noted that “nothing in Actavis strictly requires that the 
payment be in the form of money, and . . . decline[d] to hold that 
the amendments would be futile on that basis.”149 
In In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation,150 Judge Young 
shared Judge Sheridan’s broad reading of Actavis.151 In this case, a 
group of wholesale drug distributors filed antitrust claims against 
AstraZeneca and each of three generic defendants—Ranbaxy, 
Teva, and Dr. Reddy’s. The plaintiffs alleged that AstraZeneca and 
each of the three generic defendants entered into reverse payment 
agreements to keep a generic version of Nexium off the market. 
The defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint. 
AstraZeneca listed fourteen patents in the Orange Book as covering 
Nexium.152 Ranbaxy was the first ANDA filer. Ranbaxy filed its 
ANDA, which included a paragraph IV certification stating that it 
would not infringe any valid claim for the patents that expired after 
October 2007.153 AstraZeneca filed an infringement suit against 
Ranbaxy.154 Several months after AstraZeneca filed suit, Teva 
provided notice of its paragraph IV certification and was 
subsequently sued by AstraZeneca.155 Later that same year, Dr. 
Reddy’s provided notice of its paragraph IV certification and was 
also sued by AstraZeneca.156 
After the parties completed discovery in the Ranbaxy case, 
AstraZeneca and Ranbaxy settled.157 Ranbaxy agreed to the 
following: 
(1) Admit that the patents-in-suit were valid and enforceable; 
(2) Admit that Ranbaxy’s generic product would infringe some of 
the patents; and 
(3) Delay launch of its generic product until May 27, 2014.158 
 
 149.  Id. at *95. 
 150.  No. 12-md-02409-WGY, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *10 (D. Mass. 
Sept. 11, 2013).  
 151.  See id. at *62 (“This Court does not see fit to read into the opinion a strict 
limitation of its principles to monetary-based arrangements alone.”). 
 152.  Id. at *25. 
 153.  Id. at *25–26. 
 154.  Id. at *26. 
 155.  Id. at *28. 
 156.  Id. at *29. 
 157.  Id. at *30. Allegedly, under the terms of the settlement, AstraZeneca 
agreed to pay Ranbaxy over $1 billion. Id. 
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Ranbaxy retained its 180 days of market exclusivity. Before the 
court could enter final judgment in the Teva matter, AstraZeneca 
and Teva settled.159 The terms of this settlement were similar to the 
Ranbaxy settlement. Teva agreed to: 
(1) Admit that the patents listed in the Orange Book were valid 
and enforceable; 
(2) Admit that its proposed product would infringe some of the 
patents; and 
(3) Delay launch of its generic product until May 27, 2014.160 
Teva did not receive a monetary payment from AstraZeneca. 
Rather, Teva had additional liability to AstraZeneca related to its 
“at risk” launch of a generic version of Prilosec.161 The Federal 
Circuit upheld a decision that the Prilosec patents were valid 
and infringed.162 Allegedly, as part of the Nexium settlement, 
AstraZeneca forgave a significant portion of the monetary damages 
for the Prilosec infringement. 
Similarly, before the court could enter judgment in the Dr. 
Reddy’s matter, AstraZeneca settled with Dr. Reddy’s.163 Dr. Reddy’s 
agreed to refrain from challenging the Nexium patents and to 
defer launch of its product until May 27, 2014.164 Dr. Reddy’s also 
did not receive a monetary payment from AstraZeneca. Rather, Dr. 
Reddy’s had additional liability to AstraZeneca related to its “at 
risk” launch of a generic version of Accolate. AstraZeneca agreed to 
forgive this liability.165 
In their motion to dismiss, the generic defendants argued that 
they did not receive a monetary payment from AstraZeneca.166 
Rather, the defendants argued that AstraZeneca and Ranbaxy 
entered into a no-AG agreement granting Ranbaxy the exclusive 
 
 158.  Id. at *30–32. 
 159.  Id. at *34–35. 
 160.  Id. at *35. 
 161.  Id. at *35–36. 
 162.  Id. at *36 (citing In re Omeprazole Patent Litig., 536 F.3d 1361, 1375 
(Fed. Cir. 2008)). 
 163.  Id. at *37. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. at *59. The alleged billion dollar payment from AstraZeneca to 
Ranbaxy was in dispute. Judge Young stated that it did not factor in his analysis. See 
id. at *59 n.20. 
23
Taavola: Jumping into the Actavis Briar Patch—Insight into How Courts May
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
 
2014] REVERSE PAYMENT ANTITRUST PROCEEDINGS 1393 
license to market during its 180-day period of market exclusivity.167 
AstraZeneca also forgave Teva and Dr. Reddy’s of contingent 
liabilities for past patent infringement. Judge Young applied a 
broad reading of the term “payment” and found that these 
agreements constituted a reverse payment. Judge Young noted that 
“[n]owhere in Actavis did the Supreme Court explicitly require 
some sort of monetary transaction to take place for an agreement 
between a brand and generic manufacturer to constitute a reverse 
payment.”168 Yet, the court admitted that “the Supreme Court spoke 
only to the merits of cash payouts as a quid pro quo for promises of 
delayed generic market entry.”169 Judge Young adopted a broader 
interpretation of payment. Relying on the FTC’s view that no-AG 
agreements are pay-for-delay, Judge Young determined the 
AstraZeneca/Ranbaxy no-AG agreement was equivalent to a reverse 
payment.170 Judge Young also viewed the Teva and Dr. Reddy’s 
agreements as reverse payments since courts have recognized that 
contingent liabilities have value.171 
2. What Constitutes a “Large” Payment? 
In addition to the lack of clarity regarding what constitutes a 
“payment,” it is unclear what exactly constitutes a “large” payment. 
Throughout the Actavis opinion, the Court repeatedly states that 
the payment must be “large.”172 The opinion, however, provides 
little insight into what makes a payment “large.” 
In its briefing, Solvay pointed out that its payments to the 
generic manufacturers represented less than ten percent of the 
AndroGel revenues.173 The Actavis Court was not swayed by this 
argument and did not mention it in the opinion. Rather, the Court 
indicated that a payment would be “large” if the patentee pays a 
generic challenger a sum even larger than what the generic would 
gain in profits if it won the litigation and entered the market.174 
According to an amicus brief, the payments from Solvay to the 
generic manufacturers ($29–42 million per year) were estimated to 
 
 167.  Id. at *60. 
 168.  Id. at *61. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  See id. at *62 n.22. 
 171.  See id. 
 172.  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2235–37 (2013). 
 173.  Brief for Respondent Solvay Pharmaceuticals, Inc., supra note 55, at 6. 
 174.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235. 
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be greater than what the generics could have made by entering the 
market ($31.25 million per year).175 This begs the question: If 
Solvay settled with all of the generic manufacturers for only 
$29 million per year, would the payment be “large”? In addition, 
conducting such an analysis requires some detail in the record.176 
Would the plaintiff need to make such an assertion in its complaint 
to withstand a motion to dismiss? 
Moreover, the Court did not view the individual payments to 
each generic. Actavis gave up its 180-day exclusivity.177 Therefore, 
Paddock and Par could enter the market the same time as Actavis, 
yet still received significantly smaller payments from Solvay 
($2 million and $10 million per year respectively) than Actavis.178 It 
is unclear whether Paddock and Par received a sum larger than 
what it would have gained in profits if they had won the litigation 
and entered the marketplace, given that Actavis gave up its 180-day 
exclusivity. From the discussion in the opinion, it appears that the 
Court viewed the payments in total, rather than by the individual 
settlements. The Court viewed all of the parties as initial filers.179 
Solvay settled with Actavis, Par, and Paddock at around the same 
point in time.180 Would the Court have viewed the size of the Par 
and Paddock payments differently had Actavis given up its 180-day 
exclusivity and Par and Paddock settled significantly after Actavis? 
The Court also seemed to indicate that payments that reflect 
“traditional settlement considerations,” such as an amount no more 
than a rough approximation of the litigation expenses saved 
though settlement or the fair value for services, would be a 
legitimate justification for a reverse payment.181 However, the Court 
stated that the defendant would have an opportunity to present 
these justifications during the antitrust proceedings.182 Moreover, 
the Court explicitly distinguished size from scale, and inde-
pendence from other services when explaining the rule-of-reason 
 
 175.  Brief Amici Curiae of 118 Law, Economics, and Business Professors and 
the American Antitrust Institute in Support of Petitioners at 25, Actavis, 133 S. Ct. 
2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 391001. 
 176.  Id. at 25 n.7 (noting that they could not “determine the exact number 
because the district court did not allow development of the record”).  
 177.  Brief for Respondent Actavis, Inc., supra note 40, at 7. 
 178.  See supra text accompanying notes 52–54. 
 179.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235. 
 180.  See supra text accompanying notes 49–51. 
 181.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
 182.  Id. 
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approach.183 The Court stated that the “anticompetitive effects 
depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated 
future litigation costs, its independence from other services for 
which it might represent payment, and the lack of any other 
convincing justification.”184 Therefore, it is unclear what constitutes 
a “large” payment, and it is left by the Supreme Court for district 
courts to determine. 
3. What Impact, If Any, Does Giving up the 180-Day Market 
Exclusivity Have? 
The Court did not address the impact of Actavis’s choice to 
give up its 180-day exclusivity. While the Court recognized that this 
is a valuable right that can be “worth several hundred million 
dollars,”185 it does not appear to have impacted the Court’s analysis. 
By giving up this right, Actavis provided significant benefits to the 
consumer by allowing more generics to enter the market. Would 
this justify the payment? Giving up such a right does not on its face 
reflect traditional settlement considerations, since Solvay did not 
receive a direct benefit. In fact, this increased competition and 
pushed prices down. But this may be one of the “other 
justifications” referenced by the Court for the reverse payments, 
since it is an “offsetting or redeeming virtue” of the agreement.186 
IV. STRUCTURING OF THE RULE-OF-REASON ANTITRUST LITIGATION 
While the Court chose to leave it to the lower courts to 
structure the new rule-of-reason antitrust proceedings, it did 
provide some guidance. 
A. Guidance from the Supreme Court’s Actavis Opinion 
First, the Court pointed out that there is always a sliding scale 
when applying a reasonableness standard and noted that “the 
quality of proof required should vary with the circumstances.”187 
Thus, lower courts need not insist that a plaintiff “litigate the 
patent’s validity, empirically demonstrate the virtues or vices of the 
 
 183.  Id. at 2237. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  Id. at 2235. 
 186.  See id. at 2236. 
 187.  Id. at 2237–38 (citation omitted). 
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patent system, present every possible supporting fact or refute every 
possible pro-defense theory.”188 Second, the Court added additional 
insight into the rule-of-reason analysis. The likelihood that a 
reverse payment brings about anticompetitive effects depends upon 
the following four factors: 
(1) The size of the payment; 
(2) The scale of the payment in relation to the payor’s future 
litigation costs; 
(3) The payment’s independence from other services for which it 
may represent payment; 
(4) The lack of any other convincing justification.189 
The antitrust defendant may show that factors (2)–(4) provide 
a justification for the payment.190 
B. Application of the Actavis Rule-of-Reason Analysis 
So far, no court has reached the merits of an antitrust reverse 
payment case and applied a rule-of-reason analysis. But Judge Walls 
in In re Lamictal and Judge Young in In re Nexium provide some 
insight into what this analysis may look like. Judge Walls viewed 
Actavis as requiring a three part test—two steps to determine when 
to apply the rule-of-reason and then a third step applying the rule-
of-reason analysis.191 According to Judge Walls, in determining 
whether to apply the rule-of-reason analysis, the district court 
should ask: 
(1) “Is there a reverse payment?” 
The answer to this question is based upon what the parties 
exchanged in settlement and must include monetary 
payment.192 
(2) “Is the reverse payment large and unjustified?” 
The court noted that only certain reverse payments will actually 
warrant scrutiny.193 
 
 188.  Id. at 2237. 
 189.  Id. (“The existence and degree of any anticompetitive consequence may 
also vary among industries.”). 
 190.  See id. at 2236. 
 191.  In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 12-995, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 183627, at *13 (D.N.J. Dec. 6, 2012). 
 192.  Id. 
 193.  Id. 
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If these two questions are answered in the affirmative, only 
then does the court apply the reason-of-rule analysis.194 
In contrast, in evaluating a motion to dismiss, Judge Young 
applied a detailed rule-of-reason analysis to evaluate the direct 
purchasers’ claims. Judge Young did not ask Judge Walls’s 
preliminary questions. Rather, instead of applying a three-part test, 
Judge Young evaluated whether there was a reverse payment and 
whether the payment was large and unjustified. As described in 
detail above,195 the direct purchasers challenged agreements 
between AstraZeneca and three generic defendants (Ranbaxy, 
Teva, and Dr. Reddy’s). In applying the rule-of-reason analysis, 
Judge Young considered three primary factors: “(1) whether ‘the 
alleged agreement involved the exercise of power in a relevant 
economic market,’ (2) whether ‘this exercise had anti-competitive 
consequences,’ and (3) whether ‘those detriments outweighed 
efficiencies or other economic benefits.’”196 
1. Market Power in the Relevant Market 
In Judge Young’s case, the defendants challenged the direct 
purchasers’ proposed market—the brand name drug, Nexium, and 
its generic equivalents.197 The defendants argued that the proposed 
market was too narrow because it excluded other products that 
either have similar chemical structure or were used to treat 
comparable medical conditions.198 Judge Young found that this 
argument “r[a]ng hollow.”199 The relevant market for antitrust 
purposes is made up of “commodities reasonably interchangeable 
by consumers for the same purposes.”200 According to Judge Young, 
reasonable interchangeability does not depend on similarity of 
forms and functions, but instead on the cross-elasticity of 
demand—”the extent to which purchasers will accept substitute 
 
 194.  Id. at *13–14. 
 195.  See supra Part II.C.1.b. 
 196.  In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., Civ. A. No. 12-MD-02409-
WGY, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *44 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2013) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 197.  Id. at *46. 
 198.  Id. at *46–47. 
 199.  Id. at *47. 
 200.  Id. at *48 (citing United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 
U.S. 377, 395 (1956)). 
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products in instances of price fluctuation and other changes.”201 
The direct purchasers expressly alleged that Nexium only exhibits 
positive cross-elasticity with AB-rated generic versions.202 Noting 
that other courts have ruled that both a brand name drug and the 
related generics fall within the bounds of the relevant market, 
Judge Young decided that such an intense factual determination is 
best left to a jury.203 
For the purposes of deciding the motion to dismiss, Judge 
Young presumed that the relevant market was simply the brand 
name drug and the generic, and found that the Plaintiffs alleged 
more than enough facts for a reasonable jury to conclude that the 
defendants exercised market power.204 Judge Young found that 
direct evidence of market power,205 and that AstraZeneca, as a 
monopolist, charged supracompetitive prices for brand name 
Nexium.206 
2. Anticompetitive Consequences 
Defendants also argued that the direct purchasers failed to 
allege a cognizable injury to competition.207 The direct purchasers 
alleged that the generic defendants would have entered the market 
prior to the expiration of the patents but for the settlement 
agreements.208 The defendants assert this was too speculative.209 The 
generic defendants argued that there was no indication that they 
would have prevailed in litigation or launched “at risk.”210 Dr. 
Reddy’s further argued that Ranbaxy’s right of 180-day exclusivity 
precluded it from entering the market.211 Judge Young recognized 
that the case law was divided as to whether allegations based on 
speculations about generic entry into the market resting upon but-
for theories of causation raised a triable antitrust issue.212 However, 
 
 201.  Id. at *48 (citing George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, 
Inc., 508 F.2d 547, 552 (1st Cir. 1974)). 
 202.  Id. at *48–49. 
 203.  Id. at *49–50. 
 204.  Id. at *50–52. 
 205.  Id. at *52–53. 
 206.  Id. at *53. 
 207.  Id. at *53–54. 
 208.  Id. at *54. 
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Id. 
 211.  See id.  
 212.  See id. at *55–56. 
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Judge Young found that the direct purchasers’ allegations were 
sufficient. Judge Young noted that the generic defendants had 
launched “at risk” in the past and rejected Dr. Reddy’s argument, 
because courts have been skeptical of agreements that allow a first 
filer who does not intend to market its drug to use its 180-day 
exclusivity period to prohibit other generic competition.213 
In addition, Judge Young applied an “additional gloss to the 
standard antitrust-injury analysis” outlined in Actavis.214 As 
described above, the Supreme Court identified four factors that 
impact the likelihood that a reverse payment has anticompetitive 
effects—(1) the size of the payment, (2) the scale in relation to 
future litigation costs; (3) the independence from other services; 
and (4) the lack of any other convincing justification.215 Judge 
Young, at this stage in the proceedings, did not explicitly apply 
each factor. Rather, he viewed the test as stating that “only those 
reverse payment agreements whose anticompetitive consequences 
are sufficiently great and sufficiently unrelated to the settlement of 
a particular patent dispute will be censured by the courts.”216 
As described in detail above, Judge Young found that 
AstraZeneca’s no-AG agreement with Ranbaxy and AstraZeneca’s 
forgiveness of Teva’s and Dr. Reddy’s contingent liabilities for past 
patent infringement regarding different drugs should be classified 
as a payment.217 Judge Young determined that there was no 
“persuasive procompetitive justification” for the agreements.218 
Viewing the allegations in the light most favorable to the direct 
purchasers, Judge Young found that the agreements sufficiently 
implicate anticompetitive consequences to allow the case to 
proceed.219 
In his case, In re Lamictal, Judge Walls viewed the no-AG 
agreement differently. Judge Walls found the agreement would 
have minimal effects on competition because the generic was 
allowed six months of early entry, there was no payment of money, 
and the duration of the no-AG agreement was a relatively brief six 
 
 213.  Id. at *56–57. 
 214.  Id. at *57. 
 215.  See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013). 
 216.  See In re Nexium, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *58. 
 217.  See supra text accompanying notes 165–71. 
 218.  See In re Nexium, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *58. 
 219.  Id. at *58–59. 
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months.220 Judge Walls also found that the no-AG agreement was 
justified. While the “value to [the generic] of the [no-AG 
agreement] likely exceeds what the parties would have spent 
litigating the patent dispute, the consideration which the parties 
exchanged in the settlement is reasonably related to the removal of 
uncertainty created by the dispute.”221 
3. Weighing Economic Detriments Against the Economic Benefits 
In In re Nexium, Judge Young further determined that the 
defendants did not put forth “a shred of affirmative evidence” that 
tended to show that the agreements had any “procompetitive” 
benefits.222 According to Judge Young, the only conceivable benefit 
of reverse payment agreements is the settlement of patent disputes, 
and this benefit does not overcome the anticompetitive 
consequences caused by the agreements.223 Judge Young noted that 
Actavis recognized that reverse payments that reflect “traditional 
settlement considerations, such as avoided litigation costs or fair 
value for services” do not raise the same concerns.224 Judge Young 
did not find that these “traditional settlement considerations” were 
present.225 
Judge Young appeared to doubt the economic benefit of the 
agreements. Judge Young noted that the presumption of validity 
for patents is in doubt and that while patent holders have broad 
exclusionary rights, those rights are limited. He cited an FTC study 
claiming that “[g]eneric applicants prevail[] [seventy-three] 
percent of the time.”226 Therefore, Judge Young concluded that the 
direct purchasers’ complaint was sufficient.227 
 
 220.  In re Lamictal Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 9257, at *28 (D.N.J. Jan. 24, 2014). 
 221.  Id. at *29. Judge Walls distinguished In re Nexium by stating that there was 
“one crucial distinction: the plaintiffs alleged that the brand name manufacturer 
not only entered into a [no-AG] agreement but also paid the first filing generic 
millions of dollars. Id at *26. But see In re Nexium, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, 
at *60 n.20 (“[T]he inclusion of a monetary payment [from the brand name 
manufacturer to the first filed generic] ultimately does not affect this Court’s 
analysis . . . .”). 
 222.  In re Nexium, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *64. 
 223.  Id. 
 224.  Id. at *64–65. 
 225.  Id. at *65. 
 226.  Id. 
 227.  Id. at *66. 
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4. Exception to Antitrust Liability—Noerr-Pennington Immunity 
The Noerr-Pennington doctrine provides immunity “to 
persons and organizations who, with the intent to restrain trade 
and diminish competition, act in concert to petition the 
government to adopt laws and implement policies that are 
anticompetitive in nature.”228 AstraZeneca argued, on behalf of all 
defendants, that because the New Jersey District Court entered 
consent judgments sanctioning the settlement agreements, any 
anticompetitive harm is attributable to government action.229 Each 
of the agreements required court approval to go into effect. 
Moreover, the New Jersey District Court formally enjoined the 
generic defendants from placing the generic on the market.230 
Generally, private settlement agreements that are not 
approved by a judge are not provided this immunity.231 However, 
there is a question as to whether consent judgments are provided 
immunity. Relying on the framework outlined in a thirteen-year-old 
law review article, Judge Young determined that the consent 
judgments in this case would grant such immunity.232 
Judge Young’s analysis boiled down to answering a single 
question: “Is the private conduct a valid effort to influence 
government?”233 Judge Young determined that a consent judgment 
could not be considered as direct “petitioning” of the 
government.234 His rationale was that in settlement negotiations, 
the parties privately negotiate the terms and present them to the 
court.235 In contrast, a judicial opinion is aided by the adversarial 
process and the judge can review the merits of the claims.236 In 
addition, Judge Young found that the consent judgment was not 
“incidental” to the litigation.237 While such things as pre-suit 
demand letters, discovery communications, decisions regarding 
 
 228.  Id. at *67–68. 
 229.  Id. at *69. 
 230.  Id. at *70. 
 231.  Id. at *71 (citing Raymond Ku, Antitrust Immunity, the First Amendment and 
Settlements: Defining the Boundaries of the Right to Petition, 33 IND. L. REV. 385, 404 
(2000)). 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id. at *72. 
 234.  Id. at *74. 
 235.  Id. 
 236.  Id. at *73–74. 
 237.  Id. at *75–76. 
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settlement offers, and litigation threats have been granted 
immunity, Judge Young found these distinct from consent 
judgments, since they have the common purpose of persuading a 
judicial officer to redress a grievance.238 Such is not the case with a 
consent judgment. Most settlements are made without a final stamp 
from the judge and consent judgments are made at the behest of 
the private parties.239 Judge Young determined that the consent 
judgments in this action served only to “memorialize a bargained-
for agreement” and that nothing prevented the parties from simply 
stipulating to dismiss the patent actions.240 
Judge Young viewed the role of the New Jersey District Court 
as merely perfunctory.241 While AstraZeneca argued that the New 
Jersey District Court exercised its discretion in enjoining the 
generic defendants, it was unclear to Judge Young how much 
content in the agreements could be found in the consent 
judgment, since the agreements were heavily redacted and entering 
a consent decree did not reflect a court’s assent to the substance of 
the settlement agreements.242 Thus, Judge Young determined that 
the consent judgments were not afforded immunity.243 
V. INSIGHT INTO HOW COURTS MAY STRUCTURE ANTITRUST 
PROCEEDINGS AND APPLY THE ACTAVIS RULE-OF-REASON 
The differences in Judge Walls’s approach and Judge Young’s 
approach of applying Actavis demonstrate the uncertainty that the 
decision has created. Yet, the decisions provide at least some 
insight into how courts may view antitrust proceedings. First, 
reaching early resolution through a motion to dismiss or a motion 
for summary judgment may be challenging depending upon which 
approach a district court adopts and the specific terms of the 
settlement. For example, if a district court adopts Judge Young’s 
approach of subjecting all settlements to a rule-of-reason analysis, 
disagreement on the appropriate market can cause a factual 
dispute. While Judge Young appeared to be willing to entertain the 
notion that the market was larger than simply the brand name drug 
 
 238.  Id. at *76. 
 239.  Id. at *77. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id. at *79. 
 242.  Id. at *81. 
 243.  Id. at *82. 
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and its AB-rated generic versions,244 he deemed it a factual inquiry 
for the jury. In In re Nexium, the defendants proposed a market that 
included Prilosec (the active ingredient is omeprazole) and 
Nexium (the active ingredient is esomeprazole).245 Omeprazole is a 
mixture of two optical isomers246—esomeprazole (S-omeprazole) 
and R-omeprazole.247 Both are used to treat acid-related diseases.248 
Despite these similarities,249 Judge Young was unwilling to expand 
the market without a more detailed factual record.250 
Second, providing a detailed justification for the reverse 
payment will be extremely important. Judge Young took a very 
broad view of what constituted “payment” from the brand name 
manufacturer to the generic manufacturer by including the no-AG 
agreements and forgiveness of contingent liabilities.251 Since there 
is divergent case law on whether nonmonetary compensation 
constitutes a “payment,” it is important to be able to justify any 
compensation that flows from the brand name manufacturer to the 
generic manufacturer. Reading Actavis as holding that reverse 
payments are only justified if they reflect the payor’s future 
litigation costs is incorrect. The Supreme Court clearly stated that 
the payment may represent compensation for other services, or 
 
 244.  The FDA evaluates whether certain drugs are therapeutically equivalent. 
As part of this evaluation, the FDA assigns certain codes or ratings. A drug product 
that has been demonstrated as bioequivalent has the identical active ingredient, 
dosage form, route of administration, and the same strength as another drug 
product that will be given an AB-rating to that drug product. For a detailed 
discussion of FDA codes, see U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., APPROVED 
DRUG PRODUCTS WITH THERAPEUTIC EQUIVALENCE EVALUATIONS, at xiii–xx (34th ed. 
2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApproval 
Process/UCM071436.pdf.  
 245.  In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., No. 12-md-02409-WGY, 
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *26 (D. Mass. Sept. 11, 2013). 
 246.  This describes two chemical structures that are mirror images of each 
other. 
 247.  See T. Andersson et al., Pharmacokinentics and Pharmacodynamics of 
Esomeprazole, the S-Isomer of Omeprazole, 15 ALIMENTARY PHARMCOLOGY & 
THERAPEUTICS 1563, 1563 (2001). 
 248.  Id.  
 249.  In very simplistic terms, the active ingredient in Prilosec contains the 
active ingredient in Nexium plus a compound that is the mirror image of 
Nexium’s active ingredient.  
 250.  See In re Nexium, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *50. 
 251.  Id. at *60–62 (“Adopting a broader interpretation of the word ‘payment,’ 
on the other hand, serves the purpose of aligning the law with modern-day 
realities.”). 
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there may be some other convincing justification.252 The procedural 
posture of Actavis should not be forgotten. While the Actavis 
defendants described the payments as for other services, such as 
marketing to urologists and backup manufacturing, the FTC 
alleged that these payments were intended to keep the generics off 
the market.253 The Court was simply determining whether or not 
the FTC should be allowed to proceed with its case. The Court did 
not determine whether the defendants’ justifications were 
meritorious. 
Third, in addition to providing a detailed justification for the 
reverse payment, it is important to show how the payment reflects 
“traditional settlement considerations.” While not critical to Judge 
Walls’s analysis, Judge Young determined that the agreements in In 
re Nexium did not reflect traditional settlement considerations.254 
Judge Young appeared to have a very narrow view of what 
constitutes traditional settlement considerations. Part of the Teva 
and Dr. Reddy’s settlement agreements dealt with forgiving 
contingent liabilities from other cases.255 It is common for parties to 
enter into broad settlements that settle a variety of issues between 
them. In addition, it is not readily apparent how relief of an 
unrelated liability is “using . . . monopoly profits to avoid the risk of 
patent invalidation or a finding of non-infringement.”256 Rather, it 
could simply be that the parties wanted to call a truce. Whether 
such global settlements or “side deals” are part of “traditional 
settlement considerations” is up for debate. 
Fourth, antitrust defendants should be prepared to present 
evidence regarding the strength of the underlying patent. Judge 
Young made a point to mention that the presumption of validity of 
patents is in doubt and cited the FTC statistic that generics prevail 
seventy-three percent of the time.257 While other studies have found 
 
 252.  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) (“[T]he 
likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about anticompetitive effects depends 
upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor’s anticipated future litigation costs, 
its independence from other services for which it might represent payment, and 
the lack of any other convincing justification.”). 
 253.  Id. at 2229. 
 254.  In re Nexium, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *65. 
 255.  Id. at *58. 
 256.  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
 257.  In re Nexium, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *65 (citing FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION: AN FTC STUDY 16 
(2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports 
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that the generic success rate is typically less than fifty percent,258 
antitrust defendants may have to demonstrate why in their 
underlying patent case a generic victory would have been difficult. 
The evidence required will depend upon the specific allegations 
and facts of the underlying patent case. 
Fifth, there is a very slight chance that settlements may be 
granted Noerr-Pennington immunity.259 While Judge Young said 
that “the very fact that the Defendants can with a straight face 
advance this Noerr-Pennington argument based on consent 
judgments” should give judges pause, in his opinion he appears to 
slightly struggle with the fact that the New Jersey District Court 
enjoined the generic manufacturer’s from entering the market.260 
The settlement agreements were heavily redacted, and it was not 
clear how much of the settlement agreements had been endorsed 
by the court.261 This may present an opening, however small, for 
Noerr-Pennington immunity. If the defendants in an antitrust 
action can show that the court in the underlying patent dispute 
considered the terms of the settlement agreement in issuing 
judgment, there is a slight chance that the judgment may be 
provided immunity. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In his dissent in Actavis, Justice Roberts predicted “that the 
majority’s decision may very well discourage generics from 
challenging pharmaceutical patents in the first place.”262 Only time 
will tell if Justice Roberts is correct. One thing is for certain: there 
will be more litigation outlining the contours of the Actavis 
decision. The FTC has committed to pursue litigation of past, 
present, and future agreements it deems as pay-for-delay. 
Courts will have to address the basic question of what is a 
“payment.” The FTC holds the view that no-AG agreements are 
 
/generic-drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy_0.pdf). 
 258.  See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 28 
(2012). 
 259.  See Melissa Lipman, Drug Cos. Say Noerr Doctrine Bars FTC’s Pay-for-Delay 
Suit, LAW360 (Jan. 17, 2014), http://www.law360.com/articles/496522/drug-cos 
-say-noerr-doctrine-bars-ftc-s-pay-for-delay-suit.  
 260.  In re Nexium, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129696, at *82 n.29. 
 261.  Id. at *81–82. 
 262.  Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2247 (2013) 
(Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
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reverse payments. Will courts read Actavis narrowly and follow the 
rationale in In re Lamictal that reverse payments are simply 
monetary payments? Or will courts interpret Actavis broadly and 
follow Judge Young’s rationale that payments include monetary 
and nonmonetary compensation? And courts will have to establish 
criteria for what makes a payment “large.” Is the size of the 
payment based solely on the expected profits of the generic had it 
won the patent litigation? Or is “large” simply in the eye of the 
beholder? 
Courts will also have to address when to apply the rule-of-
reason analysis. Is Judge Walls correct that the district court must 
first determine whether there was a reverse payment and whether 
that payment was large and unjustified before applying the rule-of-
reason analysis? Or is Judge Young correct that such questions are 
part of the rule-of-reason analysis? 
While courts are sifting through these basic questions, one 
thing is clear: antitrust defendants should be prepared to justify any 
payment. Actavis clearly contemplates that the payment can be 
something more than a rough estimate of future litigation costs to 
the brand name manufacturer. Payments can be for unrelated 
services, but antitrust defendants should be prepared to explain, in 
detail, the value of the services and how the parties reached that 
number. What is unclear is what other justifications may exist for a 
reverse payment. If a first filer gives up its 180-day market 
exclusivity, like Actavis did, does that impact the analysis? Are there 
other “traditional settlement considerations,” like global litigation 
settlements, that would justify a reverse payment? 
While the Court rejected the FTC’s desire for a “quick look” 
approach, the rule-of-reason approach may encourage the parties, 
at least in part, to argue the merits of the underlying case. When a 
court weighs the economic detriments against the economic 
benefits, the likelihood of the generic prevailing may become an 
issue. What courts, and ultimately juries, decide is sufficient 
evidence to demonstrate that the patent is strong depends on the 
facts of the individual case and will be determined over time. 
 
37
Taavola: Jumping into the Actavis Briar Patch—Insight into How Courts May
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014
